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Abstract: In this paper we 
investigate the extent to which 
formal argumentation models can 
handle ten basic characteristics of 
informal logic identified in the 
informal logic literature. By showing 
how almost all of these 
characteristics can be successfully 
modelled formally, we claim that 
good progress can be made toward 
the project of formalizing informal 
logic. Of the formal argumentation 
models available, we chose the 
Carneades Argumentation System 
(CAS), a formal, computational 
model of argument that uses 
argument graphs as its basis, 
structures of a kind very familiar to 
practitioners of informal logic 
through their use of argument 
diagrams.  
 
 
 
Resumé: Dans cet article nous 
examinons la mesure dans laquelle 
des représentations formelles 
d'argumentation peuvent formuler 
dix caractéristiques de base de la 
logique non formelle identifiées 
dans la littérature de la logique non 
formelle. En montrant comment la 
quasi-totalité de ces caractéristiques 
peuvent être représentées 
formellement avec succès, nous 
prétendons que des progrès peuvent 
être accomplis vers le projet de 
formaliser la logique non formelle. 
Parmi les représentations 
d'argumentation disponibles, nous 
avons choisi le système Carneades 
Argumentation (SCA), une 
représentation de calcul formel 
d'argument qui utilise des schémas 
d’argument comme sa base, qui sont 
très familiers aux praticiens de la 
logique non formelle qui emploient 
des diagrammes pour représenter la 
structure des arguments. 
 
Keywords: informal logic; formal argumentation systems; real arguments; 
premise acceptability; conductive argument; RSA triangle; relevance; 
sufficiency. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
In this paper we investigate the extent to which formal 
argumentation models can handle ten characteristics of informal 
logic identified in the literature. We show how almost all of 
these characteristics can be successfully modelled formally, and 
on this basis we claim that good progress is being made toward 
the goal of formalizing informal logic. This is to assume that 
one accepts that these ten characteristics are sufficient, defining 
characteristics of informal logic. Seen in another way then, our 
analysis may open the way for further discussion to identifying 
other defining conditions of informal logic, which may or may 
not be amenable to formalization. 
 To begin then, we need to decide what requirements 
something has to meet to be an informal logic. We take the 
following ten characteristics of informal logic as our guide. (1) 
Informal logic recognizes the linked-convergent distinction, (2) 
serial arguments and (3) divergent arguments. Informal logic 
includes three postulates of good argument in the RSA triangle: 
(4) relevance, (5) premise acceptability and (6) sufficiency. (7) 
Informal logic has recognized the importance of pro-contra 
(conductive) arguments. (8)  Informal logic is concerned with 
analyzing real arguments. Johnson (2006, 246) expressed this 
characteristic as follows: “[Informal logic] may be seen as a turn 
toward seeing argument in a real-life setting as opposed to the 
artificiality of the examples associated with formal deductive 
logic”. There is also a ninth characteristic, (9) the appreciation 
of the importance of argument construction: “If one is to teach 
students about real arguments, then it is not enough to focus 
only on evaluation; one must include the task of argument 
construction—an emphasis taken from colleagues in rhetoric” 
Johnson (2006, 248). Argument construction was traditionally 
called the art of argument invention in rhetoric (Kienpointner, 
1997).  (10) There is also a tenth characteristic, one that is very 
important for rhetoric, the notion of audience. Blair (2001, 366) 
stated that there is general agreement among argumentation 
scholars that argumentation is a complex social, speech activity 
involving more than one party, adding “One cannot argue 
without at least an imaginary audience or interlocutor”.  
 The fulfillment of these particular conditions by a formal 
system justifies our hypothesis that informal logic can be 
formalized because, as shown by our survey of the literature in 
search of definitions of informal logic, although no definition 
was found which enjoys broad consensus, the ten characteristics 
identified play a central role in all the proposed definitions.  
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Thus a formal model that exhibits all of these characteristics 
would satisfy all of the proposed definitions, without having to 
accept any one definition in particular. This however leaves 
open the possibility that none of the definitions proposed thus 
far are adequate, leading to continued discussion to search for 
other characteristics and a new definition. However, in this 
paper we do not consider if there are any other conditions whose 
fulfillment allows for a better formalization. Instead of trying to 
define informal logic ourselves, we limited our task to the 
question of the amount of progress made toward formalizing 
informal logic as it is defined in the literature.   
 The word ‘formal’, as used in writings on logic and 
philosophy, can have seven different meanings. One of these 
meanings, distinguished by Barth and Krabbe (1982, 14-15), is 
that of a fundamental general term for a concept. For example, 
one might cite the term ‘triangle’, which in the Platonic 
philosophy refers to a general concept of triangularity that is 
common to all triangles. The second meaning is that of a well-
formed formula, for example in a propositional or predicate 
logic. This meaning is syntactic in nature. The third meaning is 
that of a formal system, with a set of axioms and inference rules 
used to derive theorems from the axioms. The fourth meaning 
refers to formal logic, which is a species of a formal system. A 
fifth meaning is that of a formal theory, that is, an 
axiomatization of a theory in a formal logic. A sixth meaning is 
that of a mathematical structure consisting of sets and operations 
on the sets. An example would be an algebraic structure. The 
seventh meaning is that of a formal procedure, for example the 
kinds of procedures used in court cases. 
 There are many automated systems to assist with argument 
diagramming (Scheuer et al., 2010). CAS, however has one of 
the few argument diagramming tools based on a formal, 
computational model of argument.  CAS is named after the 
Greek skeptical philosopher Carneades (Gordon and Walton, 
2006), and is open source software, available for downloading at 
http://carneades.github.io/. The point is worth emphasizing that 
there are formal systems other than calculi for classical logic, 
and that CAS is a formal, computational model of argument. It 
is computational, because the model consists of a mathematical 
structure whose operations are all computable. It is formal, 
because there is a formal calculus for computable functions 
(lambda calculus). The rest of this paper presents CAS in more 
detail and then shows how CAS can be understood as a 
formalization of informal logic, realizing all of its leading 
characteristics. 
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 There are other formal argumentation systems that have 
been developed in computer science to analyze and evaluate 
argumentation and that use argument diagrams and other tools 
comparable to those used in CAS (Besnard et al., 2014). Any 
one of these systems could be used to formalize argumentation 
of the kind we have identified as being centrally important for 
informal logic in our ten characteristics of informal logic. An 
important property of these systems is that they use 
argumentation schemes, and although they are quite capable of 
modeling deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning of certain 
kinds, like CAS they treat many argumentation schemes as 
representing forms of argument that are inherently defeasible 
(Verheij, 2003; Prakken, 2011). Again, like CAS, they formally 
model the conditions under which an argument can be either 
supported or defeated by the pro and con arguments in a given 
case. 
 One such system ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken, 2014), is 
built around the notion of defeasibility attributed to (Pollock, 
1995), that is based on a distinction between two types of 
argument attacks called undercutters and rebutters. ASPIC+ is 
based on a logical language consisting of a set of strict and 
defeasible inference rules used to build arguments from a 
knowledge base of premises that can be combined with the 
inference rules to generate a sequence of argumentation in the 
form of a directed graph leading to an ultimate conclusion in a 
tree structure (Prakken, 2011).  The logical system DefLog 
(Verheij, 2003, 2005) uses an argument diagramming tool called 
ArguMed that can be used to analyze and evaluate defeasible 
argumentation. This logical system is built around two 
connectives called primitive defeasible implication and 
dialectical negation. 
 Either of these systems can be used to do many of the 
same tasks that CAS will be shown to do in this paper. There are 
also many more resources available in artificial intelligence that 
could also be applied to the task of formalizing informal logic, 
in somewhat different ways, by using comparable tools that 
would produce comparable results in modeling typical tasks of 
argument evaluation and analysis carried out in informal logic.  
 
 
2.  The Carneades Argumentation System 
 
CAS formalizes argument graphs, as bipartite, directed graphs, 
consisting of argument nodes linked to statement nodes.  The 
CAS User Manual for the latest version can be found at 
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https://carneades.github.io. A graph is defined mathematically as 
a set of vertices, also called points or nodes, and a set of edges, 
also called lines or arcs. The graph is called a directed graph if 
every pair of its elements is an ordered pair. CAS argument 
graphs model relationships among arguments and statements 
(propositions). CAS can be used for argument construction as 
well as argument reconstruction. In the species of argument 
reconstruction familiar in informal logic, arguments are 
identified and analyzed, typically using an argument diagram, 
from source documents, for example court documents or social 
or political commentaries of the kind found in magazines 
newspapers, or on the Internet. In argument construction, also 
called argument invention (Walton and Gordon, 2012), 
arguments represented in an argument graph can be extended to 
build up new arguments constructed from a knowledge base 
consisting of evidence and facts. Argument nodes are of two 
types, pro and con. Carneades argument diagrams (or maps) 
visualize the arguments found in such sources as argument 
graphs. Conceptually it is important to distinguish such 
visualizations from the underlying mathematical structure being 
visualized. Argument graphs can be visualized in different ways 
and levels of abstraction, for different purposes.  
 Argument graphs model inferential relationships among 
arguments and statements. An argument graph is a bipartite, 
directed, labeled graph, consisting of statement nodes and 
argument nodes connected by premise and conclusion edges. 
Formally, an argument graph is a 4-tuple ⟨!, A, P, !⟩, where ! is 
a set of statement nodes, ! is a set of argument nodes, ! is a set 
of premises, and ! is a set of conclusions. The 4-tuple does not 
model a single argument, but rather a set of arguments, a whole 
argument graph. A single argument is a subgraph of the 
argument graph, where the subgraph is a tree (no cycles) and 
none of the leaves of the tree are issues but rather assumed to be 
true or false or rejected or accepted by the audience. 
 To see an example, look ahead to figure 3. The statement 
nodes are shown as the rectangular text boxes in the figure 
containing statements. The argument nodes are the two circles 
containing the plus signs. The two premises are the statements in 
the text boxes on the right. The conclusion is the statement that 
the death penalty is wrong.  
 Let ! be a propositional language, consisting of a set of 
propositional letters. Each statement node in ! is labeled with a 
propositional letter in the language !. Each argument node in ! 
is a structure ⟨id, !, d⟩, where id is some unique term naming the 
argument and ! is a Boolean value which is true if the argument 
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node is strict and false if it is defeasible. ! is also a Boolean 
value, representing the direction of the argument, which is true 
if the argument is pro its conclusion and false if it is con its 
conclusion. The premises and conclusions of an argument graph 
represent the edges of the graph, connecting the statement and 
argument nodes. 
 Each premise in ! is a structure ⟨!, !, !⟩, where 
 
1 !∈!, 
2 !∈!, 
3 ! is a Boolean value denoting the polarity of the 
premise, i.e. positive or negative. If ! is true, then the 
premise is positive, otherwise it is negative. 
Each conclusion in ! is a structure ⟨!, s⟩, where  
1 !∈!, and 
2 !∈! 
 
Every argument node has exactly one conclusion. That is, for 
every argument !∈! there exists exactly one ⟨_!,_⟩∈!. An 
argument node may have zero or more premises. No two 
argument nodes in an argument graph have the same identifier. 
Argument graphs are evaluated, relative to audiences, to 
determine the acceptability of statements in a stage (Gordon and 
Walton, 2009). Audiences are modeled as a set of assumptions 
and an assignment of weights to argument nodes. A literal is 
either a propositional variable or its negation. Where L is a 
propositional language as defined above, an audience is a 
structure <assumptions, weight>, where assumptions ⊆ L is a 
consistent set of literals assumed to be acceptable by the 
audience and weight is a partial function mapping arguments to 
real numbers in the range 0.0...1.0, representing the relative 
weights assigned by the audience to the arguments (Gordon and 
Walton, 2011). More recently we have found a method to 
evaluate cyclical argument graphs in a way compatible with the 
semantics of the original system, via a mapping from argument 
graphs to Dung abstract argumentation frameworks (Dung 
1995), similar to the mapping of ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010; Bin 
and Prakken, 2012).  
 In (Gordon, Prakken & Walton, 2007) the acceptability of 
statements was defined directly, via a set of mutually recursive 
functions, but only for acyclic argument graphs. Conflicts 
between pro and con arguments are resolved using proof 
standards. The proof standard of a statement determines how 
much proof is required for the statement to be taken as 
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acceptable (presumably true). The proof standard is used by the 
formal model argument to determine the acceptability of the 
statement. Proof standards have a legal flavor, and the notions of 
proof standards and burdens of proof modeled in CAS are 
motivated by an interest in legal applications. Several legal 
standards of proof exist, for example the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, also known as the balance of probabilities, 
the standard applicable in civil cases. The preponderance 
standard is met by the proposition at issue if its pro arguments 
are stronger than its con arguments, no matter how much 
stronger they may be. The beyond reasonable doubt standard, 
the highest standard used in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and 
the standard applicable in criminal law, requires that the 
arguments supporting the claim must not be amenable to any 
opposing arguments from critical questions that can leave any 
doubt open on whether the claim is acceptable. This standard 
does not require a proof to show that a claim is true with 
absolute certainty. It is not a standard of beyond all doubt. It 
only needs to be strong enough to overcome a reasonable doubt 
that can be raised by arguments or questions put forward by the 
defense. The clear and convincing evidence standard, lying 
between the other two standards, is higher than the 
preponderance of the evidence standard but not as high as the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard. These are just some 
examples of standards of evidence that are applicable in legal 
argumentation. The standards modelled in CAS are defined 
more precisely in section 6, where the question of how CAS 
models argument sufficiency is raised.  
 CAS also formalizes argumentation schemes. Schemes 
can be used to construct or reconstruct arguments, as well as to 
check whether arguments are “valid”, i.e. whether they properly 
instantiate the types of argument deemed normatively 
appropriate for the type of dialogue. In CAS, argument 
evaluation is the process of critically assessing arguments by 
four means: (1) revealing implicit premises, (2) validating 
whether the arguments are formally correct, by instantiating 
accepted argumentation schemes, (3) asking critical questions 
appropriate for a scheme, and (4) determining which claims are 
acceptable, taking into consideration the assumptions of the 
audience and its assessment of the relative weights of conflicting 
pro and con arguments. The first three of these tasks can be 
accomplished by comparing the argument with its 
argumentation scheme.  
 You can view a list of the argumentation schemes 
available in CAS and choose which one to apply. For example if 
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you type in the term ‘practical-reasoning’, CAS will display the 
scheme containing this term, as shown below. A1, A2, . . ., An 
represent actions and S1, S2, . . ., Sn represents “states” which 
we can think of as circumstances of a case. The argument 
identifier is represented by an id. 
 
id: practical-reasoning 
 
conclusion: A1 should be performed. 
 
premises: 
    circumstances: S1 is currently the case. 
    action: Performing A1 in S1 would bring about S2. 
    goal: G would be realized in S2. 
    value: Achieving G would promote V. 
 
assumptions: 
    CQ1: V is indeed a legitimate value. 
    CQ2: G is a worthy goal. 
    CQ3: Action A1 is possible. 
 
exceptions: 
    CQ4: There exists an action that, when performed in S1, would  
        bring about S2 more effectively than A1. 
    CQ5: There exists an action that, when performed in S1, would  
        realize G more effectively than A1. 
    CQ6: There exists an action that, when performed in S1, would  
        promote V more effectively than A1. 
    CQ7: Performing A1 in S1 would have side-effects  
        which demote V or some other value. 
 
Whenever a scheme is selected, the form will be customized to 
include premises and exceptions fields for the chosen scheme. 
The roles of the premises and exceptions will be modified to 
match the selected scheme. If no scheme matches the argument 
in a given text you are trying to reconstruct, you can put in your 
own scheme, put in no scheme, or classify the type of argument 
under a more general scheme such as deductive modus ponens 
or defeasible modus ponens. 
 CAS is capable of representing instances of any kind of 
argumentation scheme, whether deductive, inductive or 
defeasible, such as argument from expert opinion. The 
conclusion of a defeasible argument is only presumptively true. 
Defeasible arguments can be defeated by counterarguments of 
various kinds. CAS has mainly been tested on examples of legal 
argumentation, but it is open domain software, meaning that it 
can be applied in other contexts of use, including everyday 
conversational argumentation.  
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3.  Single, linked, convergent, serial and 
     divergent arguments 
 
The first step in understanding an argument diagramming sys-
tem is to see how it represents linked and convergent arguments. 
A linked argument is one where the two (or more) premises go 
together to support the conclusion. A convergent argument is 
one where each premise (or group of premises) function together 
to support the conclusion.  
 As types of structures that appear in argument diagrams, 
informal logic recognizes five kinds of arguments, single, 
linked, convergent, serial and divergent. In the simplest kind of 
case, called the single argument, there is only one premise and 
one conclusion (Walton, 1996, 84). The following example of a 
single argument is cited in (Walton, 1996, 84).  
 
Webb was promoted to vice president, therefore she will 
move to Pittsburgh. 
  
How this example is represented by CAS is shown in figure 1, 
where the plus symbol in the argument node indicates that this is 
a pro argument. CAS uses a minus sign in the argument node to 
indicate a con argument.  
 
 
Webb will move 
to Pittsburgh.
Webb was promoted 
to vice-president.  
 
Figure 1: Single argument in Carneades 
 
 
 A linked argument is an argument that has more than one 
premise, and its premises function together to give support to 
the conclusion (Walton 1996, 85). According to (Copi and Co-
hen, 1990, 20) in a linked argument with two premises, each 
premise supports the conclusion through the mediation of the 
other so that neither supports the conclusion independently. One 
of the examples given in (Walton, 1996, 87) is an instance of 
practical reasoning. 
 My goal is to get to Leiden, taking the maaldrift is the way 
to get to Leiden, therefore I should take the maaldrift:  
 
 
                                           Formalizing Informal Logic 
 
 
 
© Douglas Walton and Thomas F. Gordon. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2015), pp. 508–538. 
517 
I should take 
the Maaldrift.
My goal is to 
get to Leiden.
Taking the Maaldrift is 
the way to get to Leiden.
+p
 
 
Figure 2: Linked argument in Carneades 
 
 
The letter p in the circular argument node stands for the argu-
mentation scheme for practical reasoning. The plus sign in the 
node indicates that the argument fitting the scheme is a pro ar-
gument. The practical reasoning scheme (in its bare-bones form) 
represents the following form of argument: I (an agent) have a 
goal G; carrying out action A is the way to obtain G; therefore I 
should carry out A. 
 In a convergent argument each premise gives independent 
support to the conclusion. An example (paraphrased from Copi 
and Cohen, 1990, 22) has the conclusion that the death penalty 
is wrong. The two premises given to support this conclusion are 
(1) there is not enough evidence to show that the death penalty 
is a deterrent and (2) there are better and more effective ways to 
deal with violent crime.  
 
 
The death 
penalty is wrong.
There is not enough evidence to show 
that the death penalty is a deterrent.
There are better and more effective 
ways to deal with violent crime.  
 
Figure 3: Convergent argument in Carneades 
 
 
 As indicated in figure 3, convergent arguments are repre-
sented using multiple argument nodes, instead of using a brack-
eting line to join the premises together and then drawing the ar-
row from the bracketing line to the conclusion. 
 In a serial argument, often called a chain argument, the 
conclusion of one argument also functions as a premise in a se-
cond argument, and so forth, forming a chain of arguments. 
Typical Carneades argument maps display lots of chained argu-
ments, as the example in figure 4 shows. 
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Figure 4: CAS argument map with a chained 
argumentation structure 
 
 
 This map includes an example of a con argument, indicat-
ed by the minus sign in the node at the bottom left. It also shows 
a chained argument. The linked argument at the right, an argu-
ment from expert opinion, leads to the conclusion that the por-
trait showed evidence of being drawn by a left handed artist. 
This proposition, in turn, serves as a premise in the linked con 
argument rebutting the conclusion that painting P is a Klimt. 
This example can also be used to illustrate some points about 
how CAS evaluates arguments. 
 The top argument is also an argument from expert opin-
ion. Note that although argumentation schemes are not displayed 
in figure 4, they are represented in the underlying data model of 
the argument graph. Note that the scheme for argument from 
expert opinion could be applied to two arguments, in each in-
stance showing that there is a missing premise. For example the 
implicit premise ‘Attributing painting P is in the domain of art’ 
can be added to the top argument. 
 Figure 4 can also be used to illustrate how an argument 
graph can be evaluated by the computational model. Statement 
and argument nodes are evaluated to be one of three values: in, 
out, or undecided. In figure 4, the five in nodes representing 
statements that the audience accepts, are shown filled with gray 
(green normally, but since we can’t use color here, they are 
shown in gray). Statements that the audience rejects, out nodes, 
are filled with a red color, but none of these are shown in this 
example. The two statements that the audience neither accepts 
nor rejects, undecided nodes, are shown with a white back-
ground.  The values of the remaining statement nodes are com-
puted using proof standards and the weights assigned by the au-
dience to the argument nodes. Whether a proposition is in or out 
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initially is determined by whether or not the audience accepts it. 
In figure 4, the audience has accepted all the five propositions 
shown in boxes with gray backgrounds. The only propositions 
the audience does not accept (at least so far) are the two shown 
with white backgrounds. Given this information about what the 
audience accepts or does not, CAS can calculate whether the 
argument justifies acceptance of its conclusion or not. 
 In this instance, both premises of the top linked argument 
are accepted, and so the conclusion should also be accepted, as-
suming this argument meets its standard of proof and is there-
fore sufficient to prove the conclusion. Just on this basis alone, 
the conclusion should be shown as accepted by showing it with 
a gray background. But this argument is not sufficient to justify 
acceptance of the conclusion that the paining is a Klimt, because 
the con argument at the bottom also has to be taken into account. 
So we have to look at the bottom argument. The bottom prem-
ise, the statement that P was painted by a left handed artist, is 
shown as ‘not accepted’ by the audience.  But it is supported by 
the con argument showing at the right, a linked argument that 
has both premises accepted. Therefore CAS automatically com-
putes that proposition ‘P was painted by a left-handed artist’ is 
justified, and colors it gray. So now we have a pro argument 
with all its premises accepted pitted against a con argument with 
all its premises accepted. Which one wins the battle of the ex-
perts?  This will depend on two factors: (1) the standards of 
proof assigned each of the two arguments, and a weighing of the 
comparative strength of the two arguments. Later it will be 
shown how this is done. 
 A divergent argument (Walton 1996, 91) is one in which 
two separate conclusions are each supported by the same prem-
ise. The following example from (Walton, 1996, 91) was origi-
nally taken from a Sherlock Holmes story. Smith is not the mur-
derer, therefore (1) Robinson had nothing to do with the crime, 
and (2) Lady Gregg’s display of grief was merely a tactic to 
cover up the finding of the revolver. Figure 5 shows how diver-
gent arguments are modeled in Carneades.  
 
                           
Lady Gregg’s display of 
grief was a mere tactic.
Robinson had nothing 
to do with the crime.
Smith is not 
a murderer.
 
 
Figure 5: Carneades argument map of a divergent argument 
   Walton & Gordon 
 
 
 
© Douglas Walton and Thomas F. Gordon. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2015), pp. 508–538. 
520
 In CAS, premises and conclusions are relations between 
argument nodes and statement nodes. The same statement node 
can be a premise or conclusion of more than one argument node. 
Figures 3 and 5 provide illustrations. In Figure 3, the statement 
node for “The death penalty is wrong” is a conclusion of two 
argument nodes, with different premises. In Figure 5, the state-
ment node for “Smith is not a murderer” is a premise of two dif-
ferent argument nodes, with different conclusions.  
 Finally in this section, we reply to an objection. Can CAS 
handle the following kind of convergent argument, where the 
premises support the conclusion independently? The conclusion 
is “Foreigner X can communicate in English” and the two prem-
ises are “X has CAE” and “X has CPE”, where CAE is the Cer-
tificate in Advanced English and CPE is the Certificate of Profi-
ciency in English. Both premises treated separately as single ar-
guments support the conclusion, but since CPE is a much weak-
er and more restricted test of English linguistic ability than 
CAE, taken together as a convergent argument they do not sup-
port the conclusion independently. The influence of CAE is 
marginal, if it has any at all. Can CAS allow for representation 
of the argumentation structure in this kind of case? 
 CAS can handle this example, since it does not assume 
that arguments are independent. Argument weights are not au-
tomatically aggregated (e.g. summed) by the model. Only the 
strongest pro and con arguments are compared against each oth-
er by the proof standards. Arguments can be aggregated manual-
ly and then weighed again, but this weighing is done manually 
by the audience, not the formal model, and it is the audience’s 
responsibility to not count common features of the arguments 
multiple times. 
 
 
4.  The RSA Triangle 
 
Blair (2012, 87) wrote that when he and Ralph Johnson first 
wrote their textbook Logical Self-defense (first edition, 1977), 
they used the relevance sufficiency acceptability (RSA) triangle 
to determine whether an argument is a good one. According to 
the RSA principle, an argument is a good one if its grounds (or 
premises) singly or in combination meet three criteria. First, the 
premises have to be individually acceptable. Second, taken to-
gether the premises have to be sufficient to support the claim 
that is the conclusion of the argument. Third, the argument 
needs to be relevant as a support for the conclusion. Blair (2012, 
88) wrote that he and Johnson had the RSA criteria in mind as a 
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replacement for what he called the traditional soundness criteri-
on, which maintains that a good argument is a sound argument, 
and a sound argument is one that is deductively valid and has 
true premises.  
 Formal argumentation systems of the kind currently being 
developed in artificial intelligence use argumentation schemes to 
model defeasible forms of argument that are subject to critical 
questioning. Such systems evaluate an argument as a good one 
or not on a balance of pro and con considerations. The model 
used is a dialectical one in which an argument that is a good one 
shifts the burden of proof to a critic or opponent to provide rea-
sons for not accepting it. In particular CAS evaluates an argu-
ment in relation to whether the premises of the argument are ac-
cepted by the audience to whom the argument was directed, and 
the appropriate inferential link joining the premises to a conclu-
sion, generally represented as an argumentation scheme, trans-
ferring acceptance from the premises to the conclusion. 
 
 
5.  Acceptability 
 
A simple example of how CAS uses the device of an audience to 
evaluate arguments is shown in figure 6. Let’s consider a case of 
a deliberation dialogue where Bob has acid indigestion and is 
considering taking a medication M to treat his condition. He is 
examining the pros and cons in trying to reach a reasonable de-
cision on whether he should take M or not. He has a bottle of M 
handy and is trying to decide what to do. Bob might reason as 
shown in figure 6. Let’s say that Bob is thinking that if he takes 
M, it would relieve his acid indigestion. He tells his partner Al-
ice, “I should take M”. Using the argumentation scheme for val-
ue-based practical reasoning presented in section 2 to fill in 
some implicit premises, Bob’s reasoning could be represented in 
CAS as shown in figure 6.  
 
 
                
I should 
take M.
My goal is to treat 
my acid indigestion.
Taking M would treat 
my acid indigestion.
+p
I have acid 
indigestion.
Health is a 
value for me.
 
 
Figure 6: First argument diagram for the indigestion example 
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 Notice that this way of modeling the argument follows the 
standard way of representing value-based practical reasoning 
(Atkinson, Bench-Capon and McBurney, 2006). On this model, 
the value of health is shown as supporting the agent’s goal of 
treating his acid indigestion. When premises are put forward to 
support a claim, in an example of this sort, the normal premises 
that fit the scheme are represented as assumptions rather than 
exceptions. Critics only need to question assumptions, after 
which they act like ordinary premises which must be proved by 
the proponent of the argument. (This is how assumptions differ 
from exceptions, where the critic has the burden of proof (evi-
dential burden) and must put forward an argument proving the 
exception.) So the four premises of the practical reasoning ar-
gument are displayed in text boxes with gray backgrounds, indi-
cating audience acceptance. Since the argument fits the scheme 
for value-based practical reasoning, let’s also assume that the 
audience accepts the argument strongly enough to meet the re-
quired standard of proof to prove the conclusion ‘I should take 
M’ shown at the left of figure 6. So far then, the outcome is that 
CAS replaces the white background of the conclusion box with 
a gray background. 
 But let’s continue the dialogue a little further. Suppose 
that Alice reads the small print on the bottle, and sees that it 
warns that taking M could have a side effect of gastrointestinal 
bleeding. Here the side-effects critical question CQ7, shown in 
the CAS scheme presented in section 2, comes into play. CQ7 is 
listed as an exception, and it says that performing A1 in S1 
would have side-effects which demote V or some other value. 
So how could one proceed further to represent the structure of 
the new sequence of argumentation? By raising a critical ques-
tion, Alice’s next move in the dialogue in effect poses a coun-
terargument, and therefore we have to examine how CAS treats 
critical questions and counterarguments. 
 In the most recent versions of CAS, exceptions are treated 
as Pollock-style undercutters. (Pollock, 1995) distinguished be-
tween two kinds of counter-arguments he called rebutting de-
featers and undercutting defeaters (often referred to as rebutters 
and undercutters). A rebutter gives a reason for denying a claim 
by offering reasons to think it is false (Pollock, 1995, 40). An 
undercutter attacks the inferential link between the claim and the 
reason supporting it by undermining the reason that supported 
the claim. CAS has three ways in which one argument can at-
tack and defeat another, based on this distinction. A rebutter is 
an argument that attacks the conclusion of a prior argument by 
presenting a reason to think the conclusion is false. An undercut-
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ter attacks the argument link between the premises and the con-
clusion, for example by asking a critical question pointing to an 
exception to the holding of the argument. For example, an ar-
gument that fits the argumentation scheme for argument from 
practical reasoning could be defeated by the asking of any one 
of the critical questions shown in section 2.   
 
 
6.  Sufficiency 
 
CAS is built around the idea of modeling sufficiency by using 
proof standards to aggregate pro and con arguments (Gordon, 
Prakken and Walton, 2007). The proof standard of a statement 
determines how much proof is required for the statement to be 
deemed acceptable (presumably true). The proof standard is 
used by the computational model of argument to compute the 
acceptability of the statement (Gordon and Walton, 2009). As 
promised in section 2, it will now be shown how four proof 
standards employed in CAS are defined. 
 The conclusion of an argument is in (acceptable) if it has 
been accepted by the audience or it satisfies the proof standard 
appropriate for the type of dialogue. The standard of dialectical 
validity (DV) is met if at least one pro argument is in and no con 
argument is in. The preponderance of evidence (PE) standard is 
met if at least one pro argument is in that weighs more than 
any in con argument. The clear and convincing evidence (CE) 
standard is met if the preponderance of evidence standard is met 
and, in addition, the difference between the strongest in pro ar-
gument and the strongest in con argument is above a certain 
threshold. 
 The beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) standard is met if the 
clear and convincing evidence standard is met and, in addition, 
the weight of the weakest in con argument is below a certain 
threshold. The default proof standard is preponderance of the 
evidence, and for most applications this proof standard is suffi-
cient. Note that the preponderance of evidence standard is met 
whenever the dialectical validity standard is met. The prepon-
derance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence and beyond 
reasonable doubt standards are ordered by the amount of proof 
required, with beyond reasonable doubt requiring the most 
proof. Whenever one of these standards is met, all of weaker 
standards are also met. 
 Next we use the indigestion example to show how CAS 
models the notion of argument sufficiency using proof stand-
ards. Basically, an argument is sufficient to prove its conclusion 
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if it fulfills its burden of proof required to prove the conclusion. 
Burden of proof is set by the standard of proof appropriate for 
the argument, as determined by the user when the user puts one 
of the four standards of proof defined above. So far, as shown in 
figure 6, all three premises in the present example have been 
accepted and are thus in, and so the conclusion is also shown in 
a gray box. But in figure 7, Alice’s critical question is modeled 
as an undercutter. In CAS, an undercutter is modeled as a sec-
ondary argument that attacks the original argument. 
 
 
I should take M. My goal is to treat my acid indigestion.
Taking M would treat 
my acid indigestion.
+p
I have acid indigestion.
Taking M would have 
side-effects which demote 
V or some other value.
Taking M could 
have a side effect 
of gastrointestinal 
bleeding.
Health is a 
value for me.
Gastrointestinal 
bleeding demotes 
the value of health.
It says so 
on the bottle.
 
 
Figure 7: Second argument diagram for the indigestion example 
 
 
 In figure 7, CQ7 is represented as a con argument with a 
premise stating that taking M would have side effects that de-
mote V or some other value. The counterargument is shown not 
as attacking any premise or the conclusion of the original practi-
cal reasoning argument used by Bob, but instead its argument 
node is joined by an arrow to the argument node above it repre-
senting the scheme for practical reasoning. This example shows 
the distinctive way in which CAS models an undercutter as one 
argument attacking another. To see how CAS models this kind 
of situation, we have to see how it distributes the burden of 
proof in a dialogue when critical questions corresponding to an 
argumentation scheme are asked. 
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 How strongly the audience accepts the argument can be 
represented numerically in CAS. This feature can be used to 
break deadlocks between an opposed pair of arguments. These 
numerical weights are used by some proof standards to evaluate 
arguments. 
 The approach taken in CAS to the problem of determining 
how the burden of proof should be distributed is as follows 
(Gordon and Walton, 2011). The burden of production is dis-
tributed by dividing premises into different types: evidence for 
ordinary premises and assumptions (once challenged) must be 
produced by the proponent of the argument, while evidence for 
exceptions must be produced by the respondent. There are two 
kinds of burden of proof. One is the so-called burden of persua-
sion set at the opening stage of dialogue. The burden of persua-
sion is allocated by assigning the appropriate proof standard. 
The other is the so-called burden of production, sometimes also 
called the evidential burden, which can shift from side to side as 
the dialogue proceeds. CAS allows the burdens of production 
and persuasion to be allocated separately to either the proponent 
or the respondent and modified during the course of the dia-
logue. The initial allocation of the burden of production is regu-
lated by the premise types of the argumentation scheme applied. 
The values (in, out, undecided) of the nodes in the argument 
graph are computed by the model once the user has put in 
whether the audience accepts the premises or not, unless a critic 
questions the assumption (No reasons or arguments need to be 
put forward to question assumptions, in contrast to exceptions). 
Then the argument is evaluated using the standards of proof.   
 Looking back to figure 7, let’s see how CAS evaluates the 
argument once Alice’s move of putting forward her critical 
question has been made. First it needs to be recalled that CQ7 is 
classified in the scheme for practical reasoning as an exception. 
This means that the burden of proof is on Alice to back up her 
premise that taking M would have side effects which demote V 
or some other value by offering an additional argument to sup-
port this claim. If she fails to provide such an argument, her crit-
ical question will fail to shift the burden of proof back onto 
Bob’s side. But as the reader can see by looking at figure 7, Al-
ice has provided a pro-argument supporting her exception. This 
pro argument has three premises, one of which is the reused 
statement that health is of value for me. Note that CAS can reuse 
a premise in a different argument. 
 Not only that, Alice presents another pro argument to back 
up her premise that taking M could have a side effect of gastro-
intestinal bleeding. Assuming that all the premises of Alice's 
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counter-argument are accepted by the audience (they are as-
sumptions), Alice has fulfilled her burden of proof to support 
her assertion about the side effects of taking M. Hence CAS will 
automatically remove the gray background from the text box 
containing the conclusion that Bob should take M. In other 
words, Alice’s critical question has undercut Bob’s original ar-
gument based on practical reasoning, and has thereby shifted the 
burden of proof back onto Bob side to make another move. Bob 
could respond by providing additional arguments to back up his 
original argument, or by attacking Alice’s counterargument in 
some appropriate way. 
 
 
7.  Relevance 
 
Ballnat and Gordon (2010) provided a method of argument con-
struction for CAS, and Walton and Gordon (2012) have shown 
how the method can be applied to arguments of the kind that are 
of central interest for informal logic. To apply the method, the 
arguer needs to build his argument with the goal of getting the 
audience to accept some designated proposition that represents 
his thesis to be proved by basing his arguments on premises that 
his audience either accepts or can be led to accept by argumenta-
tion. If the audience accepts the premises, and if the argument is 
structurally correct by application of argumentation schemes, 
the audience will also need to accept the conclusion, or give ar-
guments to show why it should not. To use the system, an arguer 
provides input on which premises the audience has accepted or 
not. Then it searches for a path leading from these premises 
(along with others) to the ultimate probandum. When it finds 
such a path, it tells the user which premises remain to be accept-
ed. If it finds no such path, it gives advice on what positions 
could be useful to work towards finding a path. 
 Relevance of arguments has not yet been formally mod-
eled in CAS, but here we can briefly outline how this research 
project could plausibly be carried out, based on some previous 
work in the informal logic area. One important point (Walton, 
2004) is the argumentation schemes and their matching critical 
questions can, in many instances, be used to determine whether 
one argument is relevant to another, or whether a question or a 
statement is relevant to an argument. But the problem is that a 
single argumentation scheme by itself is very often not enough 
to determine relevance. The reason is that in typical cases argu-
ments are chained to each other, the conclusion of one argument 
being a premise in the next. Hence proving an argument is rele-
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vant to some ultimate claim representing the issue, the conflict 
of opinions in the case at issue, requires a model that can show 
how the argument links up through a series of successive argu-
ments moving toward the ultimate claim. Analyzing relevance in 
such cases requires building an argument diagram, a graph 
structure showing a sequence of inferences from premises to 
conclusions where the sequence ultimately concludes in an end-
point. 
 According to the analysis of relevance in argument given 
in (Walton, 2004), relevance needs to be defined and evaluated 
in a tree structure comparable to argument graphs in CAS. There 
needs to be a central claim, often called an ultimate probandum 
in law, at the root of the tree. This framework follows the classi-
cal stasis theory well known in rhetoric (Hohmann, 1989; Free-
man, 1998; Tindale, 1999).  Let AG be an argument graph con-
taining a statement node, C, for the claim. It is a conjecture 
made in (Ballnat and Gordon, 2010) that an argument node, A, 
in AG is relevant to C if and only if there is a path from A to C 
in AG.  Many examples of relevance, both in legal and ordinary 
arguments, are provided in (Walton, 2004). Although CAS 
could turn out to be an excellent system for modeling relevance 
of this kind, so far the project of carrying out such this research 
task has not yet begun. 
 Our proposed model of relevance, determined by the ex-
istence of a path between the argument and claim in an argu-
ment graph, seems plausible to us but remains a project for fu-
ture work. Unfortunately, we have to admit that this section de-
voted to the topic of relevance is very short and preliminary. We 
have not yet attempted to build a model of relevance. It is a cen-
trally important topic of research for argumentation studies, but 
at the same time it is a highly contested and slippery topic that is 
hard to say anything very useful about in a short space.  The 
lack of such a model of relevance is the main reason why we do 
not claim to have yet modeled all the characteristics of informal 
logic, but only to have made considerable progress towards this 
worthy goal. 
 
 
8.  Conductive Arguments 
 
We take conductive arguments to be the same as pro-contra ar-
guments. Whatever term you choose, the characteristic of them 
as a class is that they need to be evaluated by taking into account 
both the arguments for (pro) some contested claim as well as the 
(contra) arguments against it, and weigh the one side against the 
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other. The term ‘conductive argument’ is taken to have been 
coined by Wellman (1971), but actually the way the word is 
used currently in informal logic is different from the narrower 
meaning of it given by Wellman. Wellman defined conductive 
reasoning as meeting four requirements (1971, 52). (1) It is 
about a conclusion in some individual case. (2) It is drawn in-
conclusively. (3) It is drawn from one or more premises about 
the same case. (4) It is drawn without appeal to other cases. 
Amplifying the fourth point tells us as well that the most strik-
ing feature of all the examples of conductive reasoning he has 
given is that they all deal with particular cases. This definition 
clearly excludes arguments from analogy as fitting under the 
conductive category, since arguments from analogy compare 
two different cases. However, this restriction is widely ignored 
in current discussions of conductive argument. Argument from 
analogy is a very important kind of argument for informal logic, 
on our view. Much then depends on whether we stay with 
Wellman’s meaning of the term or use it a broader way to refer 
to all pro-contra argumentation. This broader way does not ex-
clude deductive arguments. A deductive argument rebuts any 
opposing defeasible argument. Opposing pro and con deductive 
arguments are also possible, but cannot be in simultaneously 
unless the statements accepted by the audience are inconsistent. 
 Wellman tells us that there are three patterns of conductive 
reasoning. The first is one where a single reason is given for the 
conclusion. He cited this example: “You ought to help him for 
he has been very kind to you” (1971, 55). This would be the 
single type of argument, of the four types classified above. The 
second one is where several reasons are given to support the 
conclusion. He cites this example: “You ought to take your son 
to the movie because you promised, and you have nothing better 
to do this afternoon” (1971, 56). This would be a convergent 
argument. The third one draws the conclusion from both posi-
tive and negative considerations. He cites this example: “Alt-
hough your lawn needs cutting, you want to take your son to the 
movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone 
by tomorrow” (1971, 57). The third pattern shows the paradigm 
pro-contra feature of conductive arguments. 
 The last example can also be classified as a convergent 
argument, but has an additional feature of interest. It is associat-
ed with the “balancing” notion of weighing the arguments on 
both sides of a disputed issue. This notion is one that many in 
the informal logic community have found so appealing while 
others dismiss is it as metaphorical (Blair and Johnson, 2011). 
This balance notion of deciding an issue by weighing one side 
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against the other has also been found highly appealing in law, 
but there too, others have strongly criticized it as an inadequate 
substitute for deciding cases on the legal rules and the facts of a 
case (McFadden, 1988). 
  Either of these arguments can be modeled by CAS, and 
that may remove some of the doubts about pro-contra argument 
on the ground that they are merely metaphorical. CAS models it 
using the pro-contra feature, but in a different way than the ar-
guments that McFadden objected to. He objected to it as a bal-
ance of interests, or as a balancing of factors on either side of a 
disputed issue. But CAS models it as a balance between op-
posed arguments. Carneades can map the lawn example as 
shown in figure 8. 
 
You should take your 
son to the movies.
Your lawn needs cutting.
The picture is ideal for children.
The picture will be gone tomorrow.
 
                
Figure 8: CAS argument map of Wellman’s lawn example 
 
 
 As shown in figure 8, the two pro arguments are “bal-
anced” by the con argument, meaning that all three arguments 
are “good” arguments that carry some evidential weight even 
though none of them individually, nor any subset of them, is de-
cisive in proving or disproving the conclusion. Should the con-
clusion be acceptable (in) or not? Even though there are two pro 
arguments against one contra argument, the number of argu-
ments is not the deciding factor. What is the deciding factor is 
the audience. Let us presume the audience has accepted all three 
of the premises. Let’s assume that family values outweigh home 
care values. Then the two pro arguments, taken together, should 
prevail over the contra argument. 
 Adler (2013) argued that conductive arguments, as they 
are commonly characterized, are impossible and therefore can’t 
exist. According to Adler, their property of non-conclusiveness 
makes conductive arguments impossible, backing up this attack 
by pointing out that Wellman never provided any definition or 
explication of ‘conclusiveness’. Blair (2013) responded by argu-
ing that Adler’s refutation of conductive arguments is based on a 
misreading of the term ‘non-conclusive’ and that therefore his 
dismissal of conductive argumentation fails. Much depends in 
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this issue on what ‘conclusive’ and ‘inconclusive’ should be 
taken to mean. 
 The word ‘conclusive’, as applied to arguments, is slip-
pery and ambiguous. In one sense, it refers to the drawing of a 
conclusion from a set of premises implying that this particular 
conclusion has now been selected so that other conclusions no 
longer need to be considered. This meaning of the word does not 
rule out that the argument may have to be revised at some point 
in the future, if a different conclusion is arrived at that will re-
place the previous one. This meaning of the term can also be 
called detachability, implying that the conclusion can now be 
detached from the argument used to support it or arrive at it. The 
idea is that it can now be seen as separately acceptable in its 
own right, and used as an acceptable premise in a new argument. 
In a different meaning of the word, to say that an argument is 
conclusive means that its conclusion has been proved to such a 
degree of certainty that there will or should be no need to with-
draw it in the future. It is easy to confuse the two meanings, and 
it is not certain which of them should be taken as the best mean-
ing of the term for logic and philosophy.  
 The first meaning appears to be a narrower one, whereas 
the second one seems to be more important for the field of phi-
losophy, where there is always a quest to look for an argument 
or proof that is conclusive. The basic idea behind the second 
meaning is that a conclusive argument leaves no room for doubt 
that its conclusion is true. But this notion is philosophically con-
troversial, because there is a school of thought in epistemology 
called skepticism that claims that no real argument is so strong 
(conclusive) that no room at all for doubting its conclusion is 
left. But even this view can maintain that an argument is conclu-
sive if it removes enough room for doubt so that the conclusion 
can be accepted as strong enough to eliminate the need for fur-
ther pro-con argumentation.  
 Deductive arguments are not conclusive, in the sense that 
a deductive argument proves its conclusion beyond all doubt. 
Deductive arguments can be attacked in two ways. First, a coun-
terargument can be found that shows that one (or more) of the 
premises of the deductive argument does not hold. Second a de-
ductive con argument can be brought forward based on premises 
more strongly accepted than the first argument, and attack it. 
The first form of con argument is called a premise attack and the 
second is called a rebuttal.  
 Conductive arguments, judging by the examples of Well-
man analyzed in this paper, certainly do seem to be defeasible, 
and if defeasibility implies inconclusiveness, in Adler’s sense of 
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the term, then Blair is certainly right to reject Adler’s rejection 
of conductive arguments. One of the merits of such arguments is 
that they are distinctly different from deductive arguments pre-
cisely because they have the property of defeasibility. In any 
event, an interesting issue is opened concerning what meaning 
‘conclusiveness’ should be taken to have. CAS can throw some 
light on this issue insofar as it relates to burdens and standards 
of proof. 
 The default proof standard in CAS is preponderance of the 
evidence, and this standard is met whenever the dialectical va-
lidity standard is met. Arguments can be weighed numerically in 
CAS or not, and if they are not weighed, the dialectical validity 
and preponderance of evidence standards give the same results. 
The preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence 
and beyond reasonable doubt standards are ordered from the 
weakest to the strongest. When one is met, all of weaker stand-
ards are also met. 
 It should be mentioned in passing that CAS also allows 
argumentation to have an opening stage, an argumentation stage 
and a closing stage, bringing in the possibility of a procedural 
side to the issue of how to determine conclusiveness of an ar-
gument. From a procedural point of view, an argument may be 
viewed as conclusive if  no further evidence or arguments may 
be put forward in the dialogue, according to the procedural rules 
(protocol) governing the dialogue. This depends on how the 
closing stage is reached in any given case, depending on closure 
rules. However, this is merely an aside, showing another of the 
many sides to the controversial question of conclusiveness. Here 
the main justification of our claim that CAS can model the con-
cept of argument sufficiency rests on its use of proof burdens 
and standards. Whether informal logic should be seen as dialec-
tical or not, in our opinion, needs to be treated as a separate is-
sue, albeit an important one for further discussions.  
 The proof standards presented above and the weights as-
signed by the audience to the arguments can at least arguably be 
taken to represent a way of thinking characteristic of systems of 
legal reasoning, such as adopted in the common law. But there 
can also be a philosophical justification offered for supporting 
the use of standards of proof in epistemology. People who take 
this approach are generally categorized as qualified skeptics, 
who take the view that no claim can be proved beyond all doubt, 
even a claim based on an immediate perception, such as ‘I now 
see a red light in front of my face’. On this skeptical view, what 
determines whether a claim is justified is the weighing of the 
pro and con arguments as evidence is collected and evaluated 
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during a procedure of asking and answering critical questions. 
For acceptance of the claim to be rationally justified, the pro ar-
guments have to be stronger than the con arguments against it to 
a degree stipulated at the opening stage of the inquiry. This de-
gree of required strength for an argument to be a proof is called 
the standard of proof. 
 Carneades the ancient philosopher was a qualified skeptic 
who held the view that no argument is conclusive in the sense 
that it proves its conclusion beyond all doubt. As skeptical phi-
losophers such as Carneades have long argued, even the argu-
ment “I now see a red light in front of my face, therefore there is 
a red light in front of my face” might turn out not to prove its 
conclusion beyond all doubt, even granting that its premises are 
accepted as true. For the qualified skeptic, there can be conclu-
sive arguments, provided a conclusive argument is defined as 
one that meets its standard of proof, perhaps even the very high 
standard of beyond reasonable doubt. According to the qualified 
skeptic, this is the highest standard that can be met by real ar-
guments. In other words, according to this viewpoint, a conclu-
sive argument should not be defined as one that proves its con-
clusion beyond all doubt, for this is a standard of proof that fal-
lible agents can never attain.  
 The proof standards modeled thus far in CAS do not com-
pare the set of pro arguments against the set of con arguments, 
but rather only compare each pro argument against each con ar-
gument.  Summing the weights of arguments to check if the sum 
of the weights of the pro arguments outweigh the sum of the 
weights of the con arguments only makes sense if the arguments 
are independent, to avoid double counting. CAS can be easily 
extended with further proof standards for comparing sets of pro 
and con arguments, but users would need to take responsibility 
to assure that these proof standards are used only when the ar-
guments are independent.  
 These issues are discussed more thoroughly in (Gordon 
and Walton, 2009). More could be said about how to model 
Wellman’s lawn-mowing example. For example we could put in 
an enthymeme stating that lawn-cutting would leave no time for 
movie-going, and so forth. But basically CAS can handle the 
pro-contra aspect, however you decide on the details or put in 
more information about what the propositions the audience ac-
cepts, how they weigh the arguments, and what proof standards 
are required. 
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9.  Conclusion 
 
Have we proved that CAS allows for a representation of all in-
formal logic-based arguments?  Our answer is that we do not 
claim to have proved this, since not all of the ten characteristics 
have been successfully modeled, at least not in a way which 
would meet with broad consensus. This applies in particular to 
the characteristic of relevance. As stated at the beginning, our 
proof of progress towards the goal of formalizing informal logic 
is premised on the assumption that these ten characteristics are 
adequate. If one does not accept this assumption, one need not 
accept our claims. However, if you read our paper as a discus-
sion of whether any formal system (particularly CAS) can fulfill 
the ten postulated requirements, it is much more interesting as a 
way forward to finding the relationship between formal models 
of argumentation of the kind currently being in artificial intelli-
gence and informal logic as practical set of tools for helping us-
ers identify, analyse and evaluate real arguments of the kind all 
of us have to deal with every day in our professional work and 
education, and indeed in all daily life.  
 Reconstructing arguments found in a text of natural lan-
guage discourse is an informal logic skill that often requires an 
ability to grasp all kinds of subtle nuances such as implicit 
premises and Gricean implicature. This kind of skill can be en-
hanced by teaching students to use such informal logic tools as 
argument diagramming and argumentation schemes. Using a 
computational tool such as CAS will not automatically analyze 
or evaluate arguments in natural language texts by itself (auton-
omously), replacing the need for such skills to be taught. But it 
can help users carry out such tasks of critically assessing argu-
ments as (1) testing whether the argument supposedly identified 
in a natural language text fits an argumentation scheme, (2) find-
ing implicit premises need to make the given argument fit the 
scheme, (3) asking appropriate critical questions matching this 
scheme, and (4) determining which claims are acceptable by us-
ing input concerning assumptions the audience presumably ac-
cepts. 
 Hence a formal argumentation system such as CAS is not 
an automated informal logic that can be mechanically applied to 
evaluate an argument without relying on the intuitions of a hu-
man user, or on using linguistic markers such as argument indi-
cator words and the like. Nevertheless, as shown in this paper a 
formal and computational argumentation system such as CAS, 
because it has a well-defined logical structure that is applicable 
to the concepts and tasks characteristic of informal logic, does 
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offer a formalization of informal logic. This has been proved by 
showing how the logical structure of CAS applies to key charac-
teristics of informal logic as a working discipline designed to 
carry out specific tasks. 
 In this paper we formulated ten characteristics of informal 
logic, based on at least some of the literature that has attempted 
to set them out in an orderly and clear manner, and showed why 
they are identifiable with the discipline of informal logic as a 
school of thought and methodology for logic. We have made our 
case that CAS can model all of these characteristics within its 
formal structure. We do not claim that CAS is the only formal 
argumentation system that can formalize informal logic, but we 
also hope we have shown that it might have some advantages for 
doing it in a useful way that can be applied to “real” arguments. 
Even though in this paper we did not use CAS to model the ar-
gumentation in a fairly large real case, this work has already 
done elsewhere, for example in (Walton, 2013). 
 The weakest link in our chain of argumentation is our hy-
pothesis that CAS can be used to model relevance. We admit 
this claim requires further research. According to Johnson 
(2009, 29) although there have been many attempts to develop a 
theory of relevance, none of them has been entirely successful. 
However, he also added (29) that sufficiency is the RSA criteri-
on that has received the least attention, and that is where CAS is 
the strongest. We claim that a strong point of CAS is its use of 
proof standards to evaluate arguments. This move is unusual in 
logic and epistemology, fields that have long suffered from their 
failure to use proof burdens and standards to determine when 
defeasible argumentation can be closed off. 
 There remain some differences of opinion within the in-
formal logic community on three key issues. One is how to de-
fine a conductive argument. A second one is whether conductive 
argument is essential for informal logic. In answer to an email 
query of mine (Sept. 12, 2012), Ralph Johnson agreed with the 
definition of conductive argument as evaluating argumentation 
by taking into account the arguments for some contested claim 
as well as the arguments against it, and weighing the one side 
against the other. He also agreed that this type of argument was 
characteristic of informal logic. Tony Blair (also on Sept. 12, 
2012) had a different approach. He specified a conductive ar-
gument as one where the arguer has decided (or already deter-
mined) that the arguments for the claim in question are good 
reasons for accepting it, and has also decided that the arguments 
against the claim in question are good reasons for rejecting it, 
but none on either side is decisive, and the strength of the com-
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bined arguments for accepting the claim outweighs the strength 
of the combined arguments for rejecting it. He remarked that he 
didn’t see a commitment to conductive arguments as essential 
for informal logic. These matters might be clarified in Blair’s 
OSSA paper on conductive argument.  
 The third issue is whether informal logic is dialectical. 
CAS argument graphs are evaluated in stages of dialogue, as 
indicated in the last example. Modeling shifts in the burden of 
proof in real arguments, we have argued using the last example, 
is part of the process of rational argumentation in dialogues that 
in our opinion, should also be a characteristic of informal logic. 
However, there are some in the informal logic community, and 
very many in the formal logic and epistemology communities, 
who might disagree that evaluating an argument requires refer-
ence to a conversational (dialogue) setting. On this point there 
appears to be a difference of opinion in the informal logic com-
munity. Some accept dialogue structures as useful tools for in-
formal logic methodology, while others appear reluctant to do 
so. As noted in section 8, it is unclear to us how the issue of the 
role of dialogue in informal logic is related to the issue of 
whether or not informal logic can be formalized. These need to 
be treated as separate (orthogonal) issues for the purpose of this 
paper, given that we have shown that informal logic can be for-
malized, no matter what position one takes on the issue of the 
role of dialogue in informal logic. 
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